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International Law Versus The
Preemptive Use of Force: Racing to
Confront the Specter of a Nuclear Iran
By ROXANA VATANPARAST *
I. Introduction
The notion that the US is getting ready to attack Iran is simply
ridiculous. Having said that, all options are on the table.
- George W. Bush (February, 2005)1
This oft-cited quote represents not just an ambiguous statement
made by President Bush, but is also analogous to the current conflict
between the United States and Iran - confusing and uncertain. At
the same time, it serves as a reminder that the preemptive use of force
against Iran for possession of a nuclear weapon is certainly a
possibility.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency
("IAEA") inspectors, Iran has been secretly pursuing technologies to
enrich uranium from 1985 to 2003.2 Enriched to a low level, uranium
is used to produce nuclear fuel, which is perinissible under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT"), but further enrichment
would make it suitable for building a nuclear bomb, which would
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1. PAUL ROGERS, A WAR TOO FAR: IRAQ, IRAN AND THE NEW
AMERICAN CENTURY 237 (2006).
2. William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, How Did a 2005 Estimate Go Awry?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/12/04/washington/04policy.html?_r=1&scp=94&sq=iran&st=nyt&oref=login>
(visited Feb. 11, 2008).
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constitute a violation of the NPT.3 The United Nations ("U.N.") has
already imposed two sets of sanctions on Iran to punish it for
enriching uranium, and a draft U.N. resolution on new sanctions
against Iran include trade curbs and a travel ban for Iran's nuclear
scientists.'
Even though Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has stated that
the United States has no intention of attacking Iran,5 the
administration has said time and again that it will not allow Iran to
have a nuclear weapon,6 and a Pentagon panel has been created to
plan a fast strike that could implement a bombing attack on Iran
within 24 hours of the President's approval.7 Furthermore, Vice-
President Dick Cheney renewed a warning that the use of force could
be an option if Iran continues to defy the West.8 In March 2006, the
United States National Security Adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, stated,
"We face no greater challenge from a single country than from
Iran .... The doctrine of preemption remains sound .... We do not
rule out the use of force before an attack occurs."9
As recently as January 2008, President Bush called Iran's
government "the world's leading sponsor of terrorism" and that the
United States is "rallying friends around the world to confront this
danger before it is too late."' Astonishingly, this statement came
after a National Intelligence Estimate report concluded that Iran
3. Iranian Leader Vows Nuclear Defiance, BBC NEWS, Feb. 23, 2007, available
at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6390067.stm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
4. Powers agree on UN Iran sanctions, BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2008, available at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7208229.stm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
5. David S. Cloud, Defense Chief Again Says U.S. Will Not Wage War With
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/
washington/16weapons.html?ex=1172466000&en=27d373bbelebcb9c&ei=5070>
(visited Feb. 11, 2008).
6. Seymour M. Hersh, The Next Act: Is a Damaged Administration Less Likely
to Attack Iran, or More?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2006, available at
<http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/11/27/061127fafact> (visited Mar. 22,
2008).
7. Report: US Working on Iran Attack Plan, MSNBC NEWS SERVICES, Feb. 24,
2007, available at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11233384/> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
8. Iran Defiant on Nuclear Programme, BBC NEWS, Feb. 25, 2007, available at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6395203.stm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
9. Id.
10. Steven Lee Myers, Bush Urges Unity Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008,
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/14/world/middleeast/14prexy.html?ex=
1358053200&en=205bb4d37d4f8796&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permali
nk> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
[Vol. 31:2
International Law v. The Preemptive Use of Force
halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003." The United States,
citing self-defense, is clear that it can and will use preemptive force
against Iran if it continues its current path of enrichment, while other
countries have already ruled out invading Iran under any
circumstance.
Under international law, a preemptive attack on Iran at this
point would be illegal. The United States administration maintains
the possibility of invoking the preemptive use of force doctrine (also
referred to as "anticipatory self-defense"), while Iranian officials
argue that they have been in compliance with the NPT and that their
nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. 3 This note analyzes
the preemptive use of force doctrine and whether its invocation by
the United States on Iran for its nuclear program would meet the
standards required under international law.
II. Sources of International Law
In order to understand the effects of a preemptive attack on Iran
on international law, an introduction to the sources of international
law would help provide a framework for analyzing such an attack.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
outlines the sources of international law in order of preference. Rules
established by treaty and agreements among sovereigns take
preference, then customary international law, general principles of
law common to mature legal systems, and finally, subsidiary
determinations of law (e.g., judicial decisions).'4
Treaties are "instruments binding at international law concluded
between international entities. . . ." In order for something to be
considered a treaty, it must be a binding instrument, i.e., the
contracting parties intended to create legal rights and duties; it must
be concluded by states or international organizations with treaty-
11. Mark Mazzetti, US. Finds Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, available at <http:l/www.nytimes.com/2007112/04/world/
middleeast/04intel.html?ex=1354510800&en=62a94f3c61cbd803&ei=5124&partner=p
ermalink&exprod=permalink> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
12. Britain has clearly stated that there are no circumstances where military
action would be justified against Iran. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 274.
13. Nazila Fathi, Ahmadinejad Sees Nuclear Energy in Iran by 2009, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2008, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/31/world/
middleeast/31iran.html?ex=1359522000&en=6f3f5e46f6a160ba&ei=5124&partner=pe
rmalink&exprod=permalink> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
14. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
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making power; must be governed by international law; and is
generally in written form. 5
Customary international law "consists of rules of law derived
from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the
law required them to act that way."' 6 Thus, customary international
law requires state practice and state acceptance of that practice as a
legal obligation (opiniojuris).
III. The Preemptive Use of Force Doctrine
The preemptive use of force doctrine, or anticipatory self-
defense, presupposes that in situations in which a state believes an
attack on its borders is imminent, the concerned state may respond
militarily to protect itself.7 The Caroline affair first established this
principle, along with its criteria, and international law scholars
consider this affair as the leading source regarding the customary
international law of self-defense. 8
A. The Caroline Affair
The concept of anticipatory self-defense was generally accepted
under customary international law as early as the nineteenth century,
when the Caroline affair established the principle as an acceptable
use of force. The Caroline affair articulated two criteria for
anticipatory self-defense: proportionality and necessity (which in turn
requires imminence).
The 1837 Caroline affair involved a group of Canadian rebels
seeking a democratic Canada that were forced to flee to Navy Island
located on the Canadian side of the Niagara River, which became
their headquarters. 9 Americans started supplying men, arms, and
provisions using the steamboat SS Caroline to the rebel headquarters,
as they were planning an invasion on Upper Canada. 20 In response,
15. U.N. Treaty Collection, Treaty Reference Guide, at 3, available at
<http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.pdf> (visited Feb. 9, 2008).
16. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
(1984).
17. Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law in
Combating Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the
Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87, 115
(2004).
18. Id. at 107.
19. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 53 (2006).
20. Id See generally Louis-Philippe Rouillard, The Caroline Case: Anticipatory
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the British seized the Caroline overnight, set it on fire, and then cast
it adrift over Niagara Falls, killing two men in the process.2'
The resulting tensions between the United States and Britain
were resolved in 1842,22 and the letters exchanged in diplomacy
between the British Minister, Lord Ashburton, and the U.S. Secretary
of State, Daniel Webster, became the basis for the principle of
anticipatory self-defense. Webster wrote that the use of force in self-
defense could be justified in situations "in which the necessity of that
self-defence [sic] is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation., 23
In order to show necessity, the state would have to show that
"the use of force by the other state was imminent and that there was
essentially nothing but forcible action that would forestall such
attack. ' '24  Thus, the necessity requirement implies an additional
showing of imminence for a preemptive attack. Webster also stated
that nothing "unreasonable or excessive" could be done in self-
defense.' Thus, the state would have to respond to an imminent
threat in a proportionate manner, such that the force used must be
proportional to the danger the state seeks to avoid.26
Other governments subsequently accepted these criteria -
necessity and proportionality - as the parameters of a new
customary international law right of anticipatory self-defense.
B. The U.N. Charter
In order to limit the use of force in international relations, the
1945 U.N. Charter ("Charter") provides restrictions on its use.
Under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter, Member states must
"refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
Seff-Defence in Contemporary International Law, 1(2) MISKOLC J. OF INT'L L. 104-20
(2004), available at <http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/-wwwdrint/20042rouillardl.htm>
(visited Feb. 12, 2008).
21. BYERS, supra note 19, at 53.
22. Id.
23. Id at 54.
24. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military
Force, 26(2) THE WASH. QUARTERLY 89, 91 (2003), available at
<http://www.cfr.org/pdf/highlight/03spring-arend.pdf> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
25. BYERS, supra note 19, at 54.
26. Arend, supra note 24, at 91.
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state., 27 Article 2, paragraph 3 states that all states "shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."'
There are only two explicit exceptions to the prohibition against
the use of force in the Charter: force authorized by the U.N. Security
Council and force used in self-defense.2 9 Article 51 of the Charter
provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security ....
There are two possible interpretations of Article 51.31 One such
interpretation is that Article 51 requires that an act of self-defense by
a Member State only occur after an armed attack occurs on that State,
and that this language supercedes preexisting rights of preemptive
self-defense.32 On the other hand, some argue that since Article 51
refers to the "inherent" right of self-defense, it seems to implicitly
incorporate preexisting customary international law of self-defense
into the treaty provision, meaning that a Member State need not wait
for an attack to occur on itself in order to act in self-defense.33 U.N.
Secretary General Koffi Annan has said that states "retain" the
inherent right of self-defense under the Charter, which could support
the latter interpretation.
Since the U.N. Security Council has not approved the use of
force by the U.S. against Iran, the only way that the U.S. could attack
Iran without violating the U.N. Charter is if the use of force is in self-
defense. Regardless of how one interprets Article 51, under the
Charter paradigm, a "unilateral preemptive strike without an
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/
charter/> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
28. Id. at 13.
29. U.N. Charter art. 51.
30. Id.
31. Arend, supra note 24, at 92.
32. BYERS, supra note 19, at 73.
33. Id.
34. The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly, New York (Sept.
23, 2003), available at <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923
.htm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
[Vol. 31:2
International Law v. The Preemptive Use of Force
imminent threat is clearly unlawful."35 Nevertheless, it seems that the
prevailing view is that "anticipatory self-defense is permissible but
traditionally has required the existence of an imminent threat."36
Also, those that support the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense
claim that the right is "limited by the requirements of necessity and
proportionality set out in the Caroline case."37 Thus, this paper will
assume that anticipatory self-defense is acceptable under
international law, as long as it meets the requirements articulated in
the Caroline affair.
IV. The Bush Doctrine
The Bush Administration introduced a different standard for
anticipatory self-defense in 2002. The Bush Doctrine of preemption
attempts to adapt the preemptive use of force doctrine to "'the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries '  and is
inconsistent with both the U.N. Charter and the Caroline affair.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the Bush
Administration argued in its 2002 National Security Strategy that the
requirement of an imminent threat had to be adapted in order to face
the new threats of WMDs and terrorism.39 During a commencement
speech at West Point, President Bush advocated "confront[ing] the
worst threats before they emerge,"' implying that even a preventive
use of force is acceptable and necessary in light of the new threats of
weapons of mass destruction ("WMDs") and terrorists.4 Thus, the
Bush Doctrine attempts to justify using force even before a threat is
imminent, and for this reason, is often referred to as the "preventive"
use of force doctrine.
35. Arend, supra note 24, at 89.
36. Steven C. Welsh, Preemptive War and International Law, Center for Defense
Information, <http://www.cdi.org/
news/law/preemptive-war.cfm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
37. Arend, supra note 24, at 96.
38. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2002), available at <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/ nss.html> (visited Mar. 31, 2008).
39. Arend, supra note 24, at 89.
40. George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military
Academy in West Point, New York (June 1, 2002), available at <http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002 presidential-documents&docid=pd0jnO2_txt-5>
(visited Feb. 11, 2008).
41. BYERS, supra note 19, at 75.
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A. Arguments Against the Bush Doctrine
i. No Need for Relaxing the Traditional Requirements for the
Preemptive Use of Force
The situation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism do
not provide reason to relax the traditional international law
requirements for the preemptive use of force in this context. The
consequences of such a relaxation would be uncertainty and danger
for the whole world.
First, WMDs are not a new problem. The first treaty on poison
gas was established in 1899.2
Second, the Bush Doctrine creates broad rights of preemptive, or
preventive, use of force, which create uncertainties with respect to
who would decide whether a potential threat is justification for the
use of force in self-defense; whether the preemptive use of force
would be merely a pretense for an "opportunistic military
intervention;" and whether the same broad rights would apply to all
countries, as customary international law requires.43
For example, since the United States itself is in violation of the
NPT by "accelerat[ing] efforts to develop battlefield nuclear weapons
designed to... destroy dangerous chemicals and weapons,""4 does
that give other countries the right to preemptively use force against
the United States, as the Bush Doctrine suggests? It would be
unclear where to draw the line as to what the requirements are for the
use of force. If simply possessing nuclear weapons is sufficient reason
to use force against a sovereign state, then India would be able to use
force against Pakistan, and vice versa; Iraq could target Israel; and
many states could target the United States, Great Britain, France,
China, and Russia,5 for they all have WMDs. It seems unjustified
why the U.S. should have a unilateral policy of preemption that only
applies to itself.
Furthermore, the U.N. Secretary General's High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, along with a group of former prime
ministers, foreign ministers, and ambassadors, disapproved of the




45. Richard Falk, The New Bush Doctrine, THE NATION, Jun. 15, 2002, available
at <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020715/falk> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
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The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive
military action, with good evidence to support them, they should be
put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it
chooses to .... For those impatient with a response, the answer
must be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk
to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on which it
continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of
unilateral preventive action.., to be accepted. Allowing one to so
act is to allow all. 46
Thus, the threat of terrorists and WMDs is not sufficient reason
to relax the traditional requirements for the preemptive use of force,
as the Bush doctrine suggests.
i The Bush Doctrine Is Not Based in Law
Some have called the Bush Doctrine the preventive doctrine,
rather than the preemptive doctrine, since the rationale for it is that a
state should strike at a time when the threat is distant because it may
be difficult to eliminate the threat once it is more imminent. 7
However, there is no such doctrine accepted in international law.'
Also, the doctrine does not have the widespread support needed to
change customary international law. 9 Since the Bush Doctrine is not
based in law, it cannot be accepted as law or as a lawful doctrine
under international law.
Further, Professor Joel Paul argues:
Two of the fundamental requirements of any international legal
doctrine are that it must first be applicable to all parties, and
second, it cannot derogate from the essential state structure of the
international legal system. If the Bush Doctrine is read as a non-
reciprocal rule - that the U.S. alone may prevent war by attacking
other states that are developing weapons of mass destruction -
then it is not a doctrine of law, it is simply a unilateral assertion of
power. Conversely, if the Bush Doctrine is read as conferring on all
states the authority to act to prevent war, then every state's
territorial sovereignty is threatened, and no practical limit on
46. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change, $ 190-91, delievered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec.
2004), available at <http://www.un.org/secureworld> (visited Mar. 31, 2008).
47. George E. Bisharat, Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in the
Confrontation with Iraq, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1,46 (2003).
48. Id.
49. BYERS, supra note 19, at 80.
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violence is retained: Pakistan is as justified as India in attacking its
neighbor to prevent a possible future use of nuclear weapons; Iran,
Iraq, Israel and Syria have license to attack each other to prevent
the acquisition of weapons technologies. Such a rule would be
wholly incompatible with the fundamental principle of minimizing
violence. For the Bush Doctrine to be accepted as law, its
proponents must articulate some limiting principle other than non-
reciprocity.0
For the foregoing reasons, and for the purposes of this paper, the
discussion will assume that the traditional international law
requirements for the preemptive use of force, as expressed in the
Caroline affair, should apply in this context instead of the Bush
Doctrine.
V. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Iran signed the NPT as a non-nuclear state in 1968 and ratified it
in 1970. The purpose of the NPT is to "prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear
disarmament."52  In 2003, Iran signed an additional protocol that
allows IAEA inspectors "access to individuals, documentation
relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned
workshops, and research and development locations."53 The United
States is also a signatory to the NPT, along with 186 other parties.
A. Iran 's Rights and Duties Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
Under the NPT, "non-nuclear weapons states are allowed to
acquire nuclear technology for civil purposes but commit themselves
50. Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine.- Making or Breaking Customary
International Law, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457,458 (2004).
51. Federation of American Scientists, Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/
text/npt3.htm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
52. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729
U.N.T.S. 161, available at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs
/Others/infcircl40.pdf > (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
53. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. Gov/2005/87 (Nov. 18, 2005),
available at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-
87.pdf> (visited Mar. 25,2008).
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not to build a bomb,"' and agree to international inspections of their
facilities.55
Article I of the NPT provides:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices.56
Under Article II:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.57
Article IV, Paragraph 1 creates an inalienable right for "all
parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes ... in conformity with Articles I
and II of this Treaty."58 Under Article V, "[n]ations that are capable
of making nuclear weapons shall forgo that possibility in exchange for
the promise by the members of the nuclear club to reduce and
eventually abolish their nuclear arsenals."'5 9
Iran has not violated the NPT by building plants secretly, since
the original NPT had a loophole that allowed construction of a pilot
54. Paul Reynolds, The American hostility towards Iran, BBC NEws, Feb. 1,
2007, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6291091.stm> (visited Feb. 11,
2008).
55. David Krieger, International Law and Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation, Feb. 2006, available at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/
2006/02/00_kriegerjiran-law-disarmament.htm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).




59. Mikhail Gorbachev, The Nuclear Threat, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 31,
2007, available at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2007/01/31_gorbachev-
nuclearthreat.htm> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
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nuclear fuel enrichment plant without declaring it for IAEA
inspections until 180 days before nuclear fuel was introduced into the
plant." Thus, Iran has the right to enrich uranium to acquire a full
nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes under the NPT, but not to the
61
extent of producing nuclear weapons.
VI. Contradictory Claims & What the Evidence Indicates
A. What the United States Claims About Iran's Nuclear Program
On May 8, 2003, Richard Boucher, a State Department
spokesperson, stated, "We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the
capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons... there is
no logical reason for Iran to pursue uranium enrichment other than to
support a weapons capability. ... "2 On August 17, 2004,
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
James Bolton told the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C.
regarding Iran's uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and the heavy
water processing plant in Arak:
The costly infrastructure to perform all these activities goes well
beyond any conceivable peaceful nuclear program. No comparable
oil-rich nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of
activities.., unless it was dead set on building nuclear
weapons .... Another unmistakable indicator of Iran's intentions
is the pattern of repeatedly lying to and providing false reports to
the IAEA.63
In November 2004, the CIA released the 721 Report, which
stipulated:
The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been
pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in contradiction
to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).64
60. Bob Aldridge, Understanding The 'War On Terrorism': Regime Change in
Iran, Pacific Life Research Center, Jan. 26, 2006, available at
<www.plrc.org/docs/060126.pdf> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
61. ANTONY H. CORDESMAN & KHALID R. AL-RODHAN, IRAN'S WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCrION: THE REAL AND POTENTIAL THREAT 66(2006).
62. JEROME R. CORSI, ATOMIC IRAN: How THE TERRORIST REGIME BOUGHT
THE BOMB AND AMERICAN POLITICIANS 37-38 (2005).
63. Id, at 38.
64. U.S. C.I.A., Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
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The U.S. claims that Iran, with its oil reserves, does not need
nuclear power since it is more expensive to generate than oil-fired
power." However, the British Parliament and the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences have conducted studies that contradict this
claim.6
The most explosive development recently in the quest for
answers is a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate report released in
December 2007 that concluded that Iran had stopped its nuclear
weapons program in 2003, and has remained frozen since.67 The
report also stated with "moderate confidence" that Iran is now
leaning towards the civilian side of the uranium enrichment
program.68
This report was released less than two months after President
Bush warned that if Iran "stays on its present course, the
international community is prepared to impose serious
consequences," 69 and that Iran's nuclear ambitions could unleash
World War 111.70 Even after the report was released, perhaps since his
credibility was once again under scrutiny, President Bush warned that
even if Iran's nuclear program is not active in the pursuit of weapons,
it could "easily resume such work unless strong international
oversight is put in place."'"
The U.S.'s primary concern with Iran obtaining nuclear weapons
is that it believes Iran sponsors terrorism,72 provides weapons to the
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000, available at <http://www.ciaonet.org/
cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr ctd_10.html> (visited Mar. 25, 2008).
65. David Isenberg, The fuel behind Iran's nuclear drive, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
Aug. 24, 2005, available at <http://www.atimes.comlatimes/MiddleEast/
GH24Ak02.html> (visited Feb. 11, 2008).
66. Id.
67. Mazzetti, supra note 11.
68. William J. Broad, The Thin Line Between Civilian and Military Nuclear
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/
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Iraqi insurgency, and that Iranian nuclear weapons could end up in
the wrong hands.73
B. What Iran Claims About Its Nuclear Program
We won't accept any new obligations. Iran has a high technical
capability and has to be recognized by the international community
as a member of the nuclear club. This is an irreversible path.
- Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi,
June 12, 2004.74
Under Article IV of the NPT, Iran insists it has an inalienable
right to develop the fuel cycle for peaceful purposes.75 Iran denies
that it is secretly trying to build nuclear arms, and consistently claims
that its nuclear program is solely for energy-producing purposes."
Iran's rapid population growth and the reduction in its export
revenues because of domestic oil consumption support the argument
that Iran needs to diversify its energy sources.77 Iran's leaders wish to
uphold the rights conferred on their country under the NPT, namely,
to enrich uranium for the purpose of producing fuel.8  Iran's
President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stated in January 2008 that Iran
would produce nuclear energy by 2009.79 Iran also announced in
January 2008 that it would cooperate on its nuclear program.
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Iran does not understand why it is under such tough international
scrutiny. Iran claims that the U.N. has imposed sanctions on a
member of the NPT (referring to itself) which has never "attacked or
threatened to use force against any United Nations member. ' '81 Also,
Iran "had placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, had
fully implemented the Additional Protocol for more than two years,
and had stated its readiness to resume its implementation."' Iran had
also allowed "more than 2,000 'person days of IAEA scrutiny' of all
of its related - and even unrelated - facilities, resulting in reported
statements by the Agency on the absence of any evidence of
diversion. '"" Iran feels that it is complying with its duties under the
NPT, and does not pose a special danger to the world, and thus,
disagrees with the need to be put under a special magnifying glass.
C What the Evidence Suggests - The IAEA Reports
Iran has been developing a nuclear fuel cycle. Have they taken the
step from that into weaponization? We have not seen that. But I
am not yet excluding that possibility.
- Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, to a U.S. Congressional
Subcommittee, March 17, 2004."4
The IAEA is an autonomous body established by the United
Nations to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy." The IAEA
has been doing inspections on Iranian facilities since 2002.
6
87According to the IAEA, Iran does not possess nuclear weapons.
The Director General of the IAEA, Mr. ElBaradei has stated that to
"develop a nuclear weapon, you need a significant quantity of highly
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enriched uranium or plutonium, and no one has seen that in Iran."'
Even though inspectors found documentation indicating Iran's
intentions of developing nuclear weapons, Mr. ElBaradei noted,
"there's a big difference between acquiring the knowledge for
enrichment and developing a bomb.,
89
In November 2007, Mr. ElBaradei reported that Iran was
operating "3,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges capable of producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons."' However, the IAEA has said
that Iran is operating its centrifuges "well below their capacity," and
that "it had not discovered any evidence that Iran was enriching to
the level that would produce bomb-grade fuel."'"
D. Uncertainties
The only thing certain about Iran's nuclear program is
uncertainty. 9' There is no reliable evidence that conclusively proves
the existence of nuclear weapons in Iran, even though there has been
a strong interest in acquiring them since the time of the shah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.93 According to the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Iran's nuclear activities can have civilian
applications; at the same time, they can be applicable to nuclear
weapons development.!
Thus far, there is no hard evidence that Iran has violated its
obligations under the NPT. In November 2006, Seymour Hersh
described a classified draft assessment by the Central Intelligence
Agency "challenging the White House's assumptions about how close
88. Dafna Linzer, Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2006, available at
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Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb."95 According to Hersh,
based on technical intelligence, such as satellite photography, the
CIA has not yet found any "conclusive evidence of a secret Iran
nuclear weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations
that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9 6
The CIA declined to comment on the report, but a senior intelligence
official confirmed the report. 7
The CIA report warned that the White House should not
presumptively conclude that a lack of evidence of a nuclear weapons
program signifies that Iran is deceiving the international community.
During the Cold War the Soviets were "skilled at deception and
misdirection, yet the American intelligence community was readily
able to unravel the details of their long-range-missile and nuclear-
weapons programs. 9 8  There is no conclusive evidence of Iran
violating its duties under the NPT, and the White House should be
wary of making presumptive conclusions regarding the existence of a
secret nuclear weapons program in Iran.
VII. Are the Requirements Met for Preemptive Use of
Force Against Iran?
A. No Necessity
i. No Imminent Threat- Inconclusive Evidence At Best
Although Iran may not have fully complied with NPT or U.N.
resolutions, it has not declared any imminent threat to the United
States. The United States cannot attack Iran preemptively without
violating international law since it has been unable to provide proof
of an imminent threat.
It is likely that Iran is still several years away from acquiring a
nuclear weapons capability.' The U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate report released in December 2007 also concluded that the
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earliest time in which Iran could potentially have a bomb is not until
at least 2013.1°° Also, Mr. ElBaradei reported that there is no
evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, and the CIA
declared that it would take Iran a decade to develop nuclear weapons,
if it sought to do so. °10 Thus, Iran is not a nuclear power, and is not
even on the brink of becoming a nuclear power.
Furthermore, a capability in itself is not a threat. For a threat to
exist, there must be a capability plus intention, and currently there is
neither any evidence of Iran's capability nor an intention to attack the
United States.'02 Some have argued that Iran's bragging about its
nuclear ambitions may indicate that it considers the bomb as a
bargaining chip, or as a deterrent, rather than a weapon it intends to
103
use.
i. Alternative Means of Resolving the Conflict
Ali Larijani, the former Iranian nuclear negotiator, said his
country was willing to give reassurances that no nuclear material
would be diverted to a weapons program, but he insisted that Iran has
the right to enrich uranium under the NPT. °' Imposing sanctions on
Iran, as the U.N. has done, could have a serious economic impact on
the country, since its population is young, there are high
unemployment rates, and high inflation rates."'
Resorting to the use of force would violate international law
since Iran has taken steps to negotiate over its enrichment program.
Iranian leaders claim their willingness to negotiate as long as there is
no pre-condition of halting its enrichment program."° President Bush
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has needlessly ruled out entreaties to Iran that could resolve "the
international deadlock over its nuclear ambitions."'O'  Even Mr.
ElBaradei has urged the U.S. to try talking to Iran instead of isolating
i.108it. l~
Finally, the United States has such overwhelming military
superiority as to dissuade Iran from aggressive action unless its
leaders are ready to commit national suicide," 9 which supports the
idea that Iran would probably not resort to the use of force without
first being attacked. Thus, the current state of the tensions between
Iran and the U.S. over Iran's nuclear program are nowhere near the
standard of necessity set forth in the Caroline affair, and there are
other means to try to resolve this conflict, if need be.
B. No Proportionality
According to the Caroline affair, when force is used in self-
defense, it must be proportional to the threat. A state is justified only
in using the amount of force that is necessary to deter an attack."1 In
order to examine whether a preemptive attack made by the U.S. on
Iran would meet the requirement of proportionality, one must
balance the damage the threat causes against the damage the
preemptive use of force would cause if implemented.
The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq offers a helpful example of the
possible impact of a preemptive strike against Iran. While Iran and
Iraq "are very different cases, much the same level of uncertainty
exists about their nuclear programs.'"" The United States' decision
to use force against Iraq in 2003 has resulted in the deaths of nearly
100,000 innocent civilians, severe injury to tens of thousands of
others, destruction of the infrastructure of the country, 2 and a
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collapse of law and order."3 One may concede the attack on Iraq was
disproportionate to the threat the United States believed it faced,
especially since Iraq did not have the means or intent to attack the
United States in the near future."'
Since the uncertainties surrounding Iran's nuclear program are
very similar to the ones that surrounded Iraq's WMDs, the U.S.
should be wary of resorting to the use of unilateral force. The
consequences of the Iraq war illustrate the disproportionate impact a
preemptive strike can have when it is based on an uncertain threat.
Furthermore, if the U.S. were to attempt to fight Iran or attack
its facilities, the result would be an even greater number of deaths
and severe injuries of civilians since Iran is a much larger country
than Iraq, and its enrichment facilities are widespread."5 Since the
threat of Iran's nuclear program is so uncertain, under international
law such a result would clearly be disproportionate to the threat.
"Iran has promised 'harm and pain' will result from any
attack,""16 and that it will strike against U.S. interests if it is attacked. 7
Iran is capable of launching a devastating retaliation with
conventional weapons, it could intervene on the Shiite side in Iraq
and cause an increased number of casualties, and it could increase its
support to Islamist resistance forces in the Palestinian territories and
to Hezbollah in Lebanon."' Thus, the indirect effects of an invocation
of the preemptive use of force doctrine against Iran would be so
disastrous, that such an invocation would severely violate the
proportionality requirement of the doctrine.
VIII. Other Grounds That Could Justify the Preemptive
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Use of Force Against Iran
Even if the preemptive use of force doctrine would not be
justifiable with respect to Iran today, there may be certain occasions
in the future that could call for invocation of the preemptive use of
force against Iran, and would be justified by international law.
A. Hypothetical: The IAEA Finds That Iran Has Violated Its
Duties Under the NPTBy Building a Nuclear Weapon
To justify a preemptive attack, the United States might argue
that Iran violated its obligations under the NPT, and that the U.S.
must use military force to enforce compliance. This alone could not
be constitute grounds for a preemptive attack, and this argument is
weakened by the fact that the United States itself is in violation of the
NPT since it has not fulfilled its obligation to disarm its nuclear
weapons under Article VI of the treaty."'
B. Hypothetical: Iran Possesses a Nuclear Weapon and Expressly
Threatens the U.S.
On the other hand, if there was definitive proof that Iran has a
nuclear weapon, and it makes its intention clear that it plans on using
the weapon to attack the United States in the next month - creating
an imminent threat - and it refuses to negotiate or comply after
sanctions have been imposed - creating necessity - for example,
that would justify a preemptive use of force, or anticipatory self-
defense, under international law, since there would be imminence and
necessity. In that case, an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities alone
would probably be sufficient in order to meet the requirement of
proportionality to the threat, since the U.S. would merely be seeking
to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities. Such an attack would likely
comply with international law standards. Nevertheless, this
hypothetical is a far cry from the current situation.
IX. Conclusion
... let's take the military option off the table. We've seen it
119. Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons.:
Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 405, 490 (2003).
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doesn't work."
- German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.' 2°
A. Problems With the Preemptive Use of Force in the Current
Context
Invoking the preemptive use of force doctrine in this context
would be illegal under international law since there is no evidence of
an imminent threat, no necessity for the use of force, and an attack at
this time would be disproportionate to the threat being deterred.
Further, such an invocation would be politically egregious since the
U.S. would set a bad example for other governments and could
increase the potential for military conflicts; an attack on Iran today
would weaken the force of international law since there is no threat
that would justify initiating war in these conditions, and since it has
already been weakened by the unilateral, unprovoked war with Iraq;
it would strengthen and unite the Middle East and the Arabs with
Iran; and Iran could create a deep global recession by embargoing its
oil if it is attacked.121
B. Fundamental Problems with the Doctrine as a Whole
The preemptive use of force doctrine has some inherent
problems, regardless of the situation. One such flaw of the
preemptive doctrine is the fact that in many instances one cannot
know for certain until after the fact whether the attack was justified.
It is always difficult to substantiate threats in advance because of the
uncertain nature of a preemptive attack.
A perfect illustration of the doctrine's flaws is the war in Iraq,
which is regarded throughout the world as illegal under international
law.1 22 The two justifications for the Iraq war under the Bush
administration was that the U.S. faced an imminent attack that Iraq
would use weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq had links to Al
Qaeda. Both beliefs have been since discredited.1" The Iraq War has
120. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 274.
121. Id.
122. Krieger, supra note 112.
123. Id.
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124been a step backward for international law since the preemptive
strike occurred despite objections from the U.N. and without
international support.
Professor Philippe Sands describes a memo of a meeting between
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair at the White House on
January 31, 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion -
revealing that Mr. Bush made it clear the U.S. intended to invade
whether or not there was a second U.N. resolution and even if U.N.
inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme
[sic]."'' 2 5 The situation with Iran today is particularly suspicious since
the charges made against Iran, and the lack of evidence to support
them, are "ominously similar to the spurious claims the Bush
administration leveled against Iraq as a cause for initiating that
w ar."
126
The preemptive use of force doctrine was never meant to serve
as merely a pretense for attacking a foreign country. Thus, perhaps a
higher standard of certainty of an imminent threat should be required
when invoking the doctrine in any situation - a standard that clearly
would not be met in the current context of Iran - in order to avoid
grave miscalculations and misrepresentations similar to the ones that
occurred just before the War in Iraq.
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